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Abstract  
Taking advantage of African experience, this paper proposes to enrich empirically the issue 
of fiscal space. Africa has markedly achieved significant economic progress since the 80's 
decade crisis. However, this progress has been proven insufficient to curb dramatically the 
infrastructures gap and poverty because of the shortage of funding. While several ways are 
being looked for creating a sustained fiscal space, this paper argues that improving the 
quality of public spending remains the key avenue. It then derives fiscal space by computing 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) efficiency scores of public spending using a group of 62 
African and non-African countries over the period 1980-2013. The results indicate that on 
average African countries are less efficient than their peers. The average efficiency score of 
public spending for African countries relatively to their peers is 0.585 suggesting that they 
could reduce their spending by 41.5% to achieve the same results. This results in a lost fiscal 
space of about 11.5% of GDP equivalent to 43.8% of the outlay used and 3/4 of the current 
level of tax revenues. However, they have achieved a substantial improvement in efficiency 
change over time. Moreover, the results evidence that this estimated lost fiscal space is tied 
to the other indicators of fiscal space. In particular, larger lost fiscal space is positively 
correlated with foreign aid and external debt inflows but negatively with tax capacity. 
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1 Introduction
Africa has markedly made headway since the end of the 80's decade crisis. The continent is
one of the world's fastest-growing region in spite of a context of harsh global imbalances and
nancial crisis. Over the last decade, African economy increased by more than 5% per year.
Some human development indicators have set some encouraging progress. For instance, the
global infant mortality rate fell from 168.1 deaths per 1,000 live births over the period 1990-1995
to 100.6 over 2010-2015 (United Nations, 2013). The gross rate of secondary school enrollment in
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has doubled between 1985 to 20091. According to many institutions,
these results arise from better good governance and scal aairs management (Panel, 2014).
The policies associated to the debt reduction initiatives, the increase and the improvement in
aid systems have certainly released greater scal space. This suggests that governments have
beneted from more budget room that allows them to fund their priorities without worsening
their solvency and the stability of the economy (Heller, 2005).
However, the continent continues to face huge challenges. The recent Ebola outbreak has revealed
that the current performances are vulnerable. The gap of infrastructures remains important and
continues to retard a fair development of the dierent economic sectors. A study of AICD2
reported by OECD (2012) states that the annual funding gap is estimated to US$ 93 billion.
As a result, the strong growth has not generated a signicant poverty reduction in the region
leading it to adopt an inclusive growth (IG) agenda for 2063. Meanwhile, it has to cope with a
recent emergence of terrorism to alleviate the investors' concerns.
The region therefore needs more nancial resources to strengthen its recent progress and support
its IG agenda. But the nancial contribution of the domestic private sector is currently lim-
ited because of a low nancial depth and a dicult access to the international capital markets.
Creating a wider scal space becomes therefore inescapable. In practice, countries can expand
their scal space by increasing tax revenues, borrowing from domestic and international markets,
1http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Documents/ged-2011-fr.pdf.pdf
2Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD). It is a project designed to expand the worlds knowledge of
physical infrastructure in Africa and supported by the World Bank, the African Union, the Agence Francaise de
Developpement, the Department for International Development (U.K.), the European Union, the New Economic
Partnership for Africas Development, and the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility.
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seigniorage, mobilizing foreign aid, or by increasing the eciency of their spending (Heller, 2006;
Debrun et al., 2006; Melecky and Raddatz, 2015). Nevertheless, there is a strong evidence that
the use of some of these instruments is limited by the potential noxious consequences they may
involve. The recent sovereign debt crisis in the world and the ongoing one in Greece highlight that
public debt may pose serious concerns for scal sustainability and economic growth, as the theo-
ries of debt overhang and intolerance predict. In Africa with a limited domestic saving, funding
public spending through domestic borrowing may seriously crowd out private investment. Be-
cause potentially inationary, seigniorage may induce huge macroeconomic uncertainties. Now,
it is less used since most of the countries have adopted ination targeting. Regarding aid, al-
though it has been an important funding option for the continent, it has declined during the
last decade. Moreover, the current tightening scal policies in donor countries do not guarantee
a further surge in aid for next years. Aid unpredictability may also harm a good medium-term
budget planning. Taxation and improving the eciency of spending remain the two potentials
to harness fully. But, despite a recent greater attention to taxation, most of the countries have
diculty in reaching the minimum level of 20% of GDP of tax revenues as recommended by
the United Nations. Rather than increasing funding, scal space literature emphasizes that im-
proving the quality of public spending, i.e. improving eciency, is the best way to address the
shortage of resources without compromising the sustainability of public budget. But it does not
pay much attention to the estimation of this "scal space", i.e. here the potential progress in
improving public spending (the same public service delivery with less money), assuming given
revenue unchanged as the constraint.
This paper therefore estimates the scal space African countries could have mobilized by improv-
ing the quality of public spending. The quality of public spending is measured by computing
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) eciency's scores. This approach allows to estimate the
amount of spending a country would have saved in order to reach the same level of output in
comparison with its peers. As outputs, I use a set of human and sectoral development indicators
that are close to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Countries' performances are then
assessed closely to their own dened objectives.
The present approach enriches the existing measures of scal space. Ghosh et al. (2013) propose
5
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the gap between the observed value of debt and a potential debt limit from which scal solvency
is of concern. Aizenman et al. (2013) refer to the number of tax-years a country would take
to repay its debt. Brun et al. (2006) emphasizes on the deviation of domestic tax level from
its potential. In spite of the relevance of these approaches, the inconclusiveness of the scal
policy literature (Rogo and Reinhart, 2010; Minea et al., 2012) is illustrative that an additional
variable is necessary in assessing scal space. The alternative proposed in this paper is built on
the meaningful assumption that ineciency of public spending matters.
This paper is not the rst to assess the eciency of public spending in Africa. Gupta and Verhoeven
(2001), Chemli and Neticha (2006) and Pang and Herrera (2005) have yet done similar exercises
by focusing on some specic areas such as education and health. In contrast, the present paper
clearly analyzes the challenges of the quality of public nances for building a sustainable scal
space and poverty alleviation in African region. Moreover, it considers the two major compo-
nents of public budget, investment and consumption, as inputs. Indeed, the structure of public
spending is identied in literature as a starting-point of its quality; investment is typically seen
as productive and consumption not. But the issue is still on debate. Some recent ndings from
IMF sta (Dabla-Norris et al., 2012; International Monetary Fund, 2015) indicate that high in-
vestment does not necessarily mean increased productivity. Here, I analyze investment and
consumption as complements since they often need each other to be eective. In addition, the
paper uses an updated dataset of 45 African countries over 1980-2013. This extensive panel data
aids to catch the dynamics between countries' performances and the quality in public aairs
management over comprehensive sub-periods.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 denes the concept of scal space
adopted and its measurements. Section 3 explains the methodology. Section 4 presents the
results. Section 5 concludes.
6
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2 Fiscal space and quality of budget allocations
Economists and decision-makers are increasingly paying attention to the concept of "scal space".
Heller (2005) has dened it as room in a governments budget that allows it to provide resources
for a desired purpose without jeopardizing the sustainability of its nancial position or the
stability of the economy. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have put on
this denition by stating that "scal space exists when a government can increase expenditure
without impairing its scal solvency, i.e. without impairing its capacity to service its debt.",
(Committee et al., 2006). For Roy and Heuty (2012), this denition of scal space focusing on
sustainability is limited by the fact it does not stress on the key actions to mobilize resources
for MDGs' funding. They then dene scal space as: "concrete policy actions for enhancing
domestic resource mobilization, and the reforms necessary to secure the enabling governance,
institutional and economic environment for these policy actions to be eective". The literature
identies several ways to gauge scal space depending on the focus of the paper.
Ghosh et al. (2013) dene scal space as the distance between the current debt level and the debt
limit beyond which scal solvency is in doubt. Drawing on the works of Bohn (1998, 2008) as well
as those of Mendoza and Ostry (2008) and Ostry and Abiad (2005), the debt limit is determined
by estimating a primary scal balance reaction function which uses the squared and cubic debt
terms besides some other control variables. Aizenman and Jinjarak (2010) and Aizenman et al.
(2013) dene scal space, called de facto, as the inverse of the tax-years it would take to repay
the public debt. Specically, it measures the outstanding public debt relative to the de facto
tax base, where the latter measures the realized tax collection, averaged across several years
to smooth the business cycle uctuations. Brun et al. (2006) adopt a tax eort approach and
derive scal space as the ratio of the current level of revenues to potential tax revenues, based
on structural indicators such as GDP per capita and sectoral values added.
In this present paper, I derive scal space by the quality of public spending by linking its use
to its outcomes. Whatever the denition considered, the key point in scal space concept is
how much a country can dispose some room for scal maneuver. This begins by improving the
quality of the existing revenues in achieving the goals. The better it gets, the lower is the need
7
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of borrowing and the risk of scal insolvency. Moreover, the quality of public service delivery
may encourage tax compliance and consequently the domestic revenue collection.
The concept of "quality of public spending" cannot be separated from that of the whole public
nance including revenues. Borrowing from Barrios and Schaechter (2008), it comprises the
policies that ensure sound budgetary stances, long-sustainability and those that increase the
production potential and facilitate the economy to adjust to shocks. The achievement of these
outcomes requires an ecient and eective use of public revenues while creating incentives for an
ecient functioning of labor, goods and services markets. The inconclusiveness of the literature
on the eect of government size on growth has led to establish that this eect varies across
countries and over time depending on its level and its quality. In terms of size, common thinking
is that low unlike high levels of government are associated with increased sustained growth
because it likely generates less tax distortion and eviction of the private sector.
This quality is approximated by two aspects: the structure and the eciency. The structure-
related-quality hypothesis distinguishes between the categories of spending that potentially pro-
mote growth from those that harm it. Thereby, government consumption and military spending
are viewed as counterproductive while investment in infrastructures development, in education or
in health are growth-enhancing. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence remains mixed suggesting
that the composition assumption is not sucient. The results depend on the scal size and the
conditions (macroeconomic policies, governance, corruption etc.) under which they are spent.
In the case of African countries, Devarajan et al. (2003) nd that they do not suer of any
problem of underinvestment but of eciency constraints. On the contrary, Fosu et al. (2012)
show that they are hit by underinvestment. Recent ndings of Dabla-Norris et al. (2012) and
International Monetary Fund (2015) stress that the key point of investment's productivity is its
eciency.
The eciency-related-quality hypothesis looks for the way resources are used to reach their goals.
The latter denition also makes a crucial distinction between 'eectiveness' and 'eciency'.
Public spending is eective if it reaches its outcome independently of how much is invested. In
contrast, eciency questions whether countries could achieve better outcomes at current levels
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of spending (Verhoeven et al., 2007) or whether the same outcomes could be obtained with lower
levels of spending. In that case, eciency is superior than eectiveness to the extent that it
includes the latter. The current paper considers quality of public spending as good if the latter
is ecient.
Eciency is generally measured as the distance to a production frontier through non-parametric
and parametric methods. The non-parametric approaches are the Free Disposal Hull (FDH) and
the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). They relate multiple inputs and outputs to account for
the gap between potential output allowed by given quantities of inputs and the level of output
currently achieved with the same quantities. Each country's eciency is therefore evaluated
relative to its peers distinguishing best practices from lower ones. Countries that are ecient
than others get a score of one whereas the less ecient ones are rated lower. For instance, an
input eciency of 0.7 for a country means that the latter could reduce the level of input by 30%
to get the same level of output or to be ecient. Thus, the non-parametric approaches allow for
estimating the level of wasted resources of the producer.
The parametric methods consist in estimating a stochastic eciency frontier assuming a func-
tional form of production such as Cobb-Douglass or translog (Barrios and Schaechter, 2008).
Unlike non-parametric approaches, parametric ones dissociate the exogenous eects from the
eciency ones by decomposing the residual into two components: a random error term and an
ineciency term. They also allow to test the standard statistical properties. Parametric ap-
proach allows to correct the sensitivity of the results to the existence of outliers. However, they
require strong assumptions and a large number of observations. Especially, they outperform
non parametric approaches only when the estimated stochastic frontier is close to the assumed
technology (Rayp and Van De Sijpe, 2007). Moreover they are usually suitable for micro-level
data whereas some authors question their ability to eectively decompose noise and ineciency
(Banker et al., 1993; Ruggiero, 1999; Rayp and Van De Sijpe, 2007).
A number of studies use the non-parametric approaches to compare the performances of public
spending among countries. Thus, Gupta and Verhoeven (2001) resort to FDH to assess the ef-
ciency of public expenditure on education and health of 37 African countries relative to each
9
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other and also to Asia and the Western Hemisphere over the period 1984-1995. Their ndings
indicate that on average African countries are less ecient than the latter regions although their
eciency has been improved during this period. They also nd that among African countries,
the least performant ones (like Cote d'Ivoire and Botswana) record better income distribution
than the most ecient ones like Ethiopia and Lesotho. According to these authors, ineciency
is caused by high wages practices in the education sector and intra-sectoral misallocation of re-
sources. Chemli and Neticha (2006) use DEA approach to calculate the scores of eciency of
public spending in education and health of 45 developing countries including African countries
over the period 1990-2002. Their calculations show a weak eciency about 30%. Further re-
gressions point out that these spendings do not support economic growth due to the low level
of their quality. Pang and Herrera (2005) using FDH and DEA techniques in a sample of 140
developing countries over the period 1996-2002 come to similar conclusion. Countries with larger
size of government and in particular with larger share of wage bill of the total budget are less
ecient. Furthermore, Afonso et al. (2005) nd, from DEA approach, that the most ecient
members of OECD spend on average 30% less than their European partners to achieve the same
performances. Afonso et al. (2010) analyze public sector eciency in the new EU member states
compared relative to emerging markets. DEA computations show that expenditure eciency
across the former as compared to the group of top performing of the emerging market in Asia is
diverse.
3 Methodology
3.1 The public spending eciency scores
Building on Afonso et al. (2010), the general relationship that I am testing can be given by the
following function for each country i :
Yi = f(Xi); i = 1:::n (1)
10
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where Yi is a composite indicator reecting the output measure; Xi denotes the dierent com-
ponents of public spending or inputs in country i. For an actual output Y < f(Xi), country i
exhibits ineciency. For the observed input level, the actual output is smaller than the best at-
tainable one and ineciency can then be measured by computing the distance to the theoretical
eciency frontier.
Following the common practice in macroeconomic literature (Barrios and Schaechter, 2008), the
eciency scores will be computed by a DEA approach originating from the seminal work of
Farrell (1957) and popularized by Charnes et al. (1978) (Afonso et al., 2010). This preference
relatively to the stochastic approach is grounded in the diculty to determine the a priori
technological function of the government at macroeconomic level. As stated before, DEA is a
non-parametric mathematical programming approach which calculates eciency in production.
It constructs an envelopment frontier over the data points such that all the observations lie on
or below the production frontier (Coelli, 1996). The program is computed under the assumption
of constant return scale (CRS) or variable return scale (VRS). Unlike CRS, VRS is convenient
when the Decision Making Units (DMU's) are operating at a non-optimal scale environment
(Coelli, 1996). Due to constraints on resources, diculties to access to international funding in
particular to the private one, I can assume that African countries are not operating at an optimal
scale environment. So, VRS is the appropriate hypothesis to hold in this work.
Choosing input or output orientation is another assumption when computing DEA. The input
orientation aims at determining how much input quantities (spending) can be proportionally
reduced without changing the quantities of the output produced. In contrast, the output orien-
tation maintains unchanged the input and looks for the maximum output to attain. Since the
rationale of the paper is to measure the amount of scal room countries can free up to support
their progress, I use the former orientation. Another reason in favor of the input-orientation is
that governments have most control over their spending than the outputs. Program (2) is that
11
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of VRS with an input-orientation.
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
Min 
st  yi + Y   0
xi X  0
N10 = 1
  0
(2)
where Y (M*N) is the matrix of outputs and X(K*N) is that of inputs. K, M are respectively
the number of the inputs and outputs. N is the number of the decision making units i (DMUs,
countries).  is a scalar and measures the eciency score. It must satisfy   1. For  = 1,
the country is on the frontier and hence technically ecient while (1   ) is the level of public
spending which would be reduced to achieve the same eciency without changing the output.
 is a N*1 vector of constants that measures the weights used to compute the location of an
inecient country if it were to become ecient. The inecient country would be projected
on the production frontier as a linear combination of those weights, related to the peers of the
inecient country. N1 is an n-dimensional vector of ones.
With a panel data, it is interesting to measure the productivity change and its main driver in
a particular period. This is possible via a Malmquist total factor productivity (TFP) index.
It decomposes the TFP index into technical change and technical eciency change. Clearly, a
positive technical eciency change means that the eciency improvement results from a better
management of the resources with the current technology over a period of time. A positive
technical change suggests that the eciency improvement results from innovation (new scien-
tic and technical knowledge, products and techniques in the provision of the output services
(Kirigia et al., 2011)).
mo(yt+1; xt+1; yt; xt) =

dto(xt+1; yt+1)
dto(xt; yt)
 d
t+1
o (xt+1; yt+1)
dt+1o (xt; yt)
1=2
(3)
A mo index greater than one indicates positive TFP growth from period t to period t + 1. An
index inferior to 1 means a decrease. When equal to 1, there is no change. The four component
12
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distance functions dt+ao ; a = 0:::n are linear programs problems like that of the program (2) (see
Coelli (1996) for an extensive development). Programs (2) and (3) must be jointly solved N
times once for each country in the sample.
3.2 Data
I use a panel of 45 African countries over the period 1980-2013. However, the eects of some
public choices may be perceptible over more than a year later. For instance, the building of
infrastructures like roads and bridges, health and school infrastructures is often made over several
years. In order to circumvent a such "annual bias", I average data over ve years with the
exception of the last period 2010-2013 which is four years average. This also helps to circumvent
the data unavailability on some years for some countries. Let's us mind one that DEAP is
applicable only for a balanced panel data. In addition, DEA approach compares countries of
the same sample. Since, this may lead one to conclude that a potentially-inecient country is
ecient, I tried to include a large set of non-African emerging and developing economies following
IMF's classication. But, due to data availability and quality I limit the number of non-African
countries to 17. The empirical studies are very often bound to such a limited sample because of
data limitations (see for instance Rayp and Van De Sijpe (2007) and Rahmayantia and Hornb
(2011)). However, this approach is also relevant to compare where African countries are ranked
and/or progressed relatively to the other countries. In fact, in the light of the considerable
progress of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, most of the African countries have
recently and increasingly targeted "emergence". In terms of economic policy, this is equivalent to
manage public aairs so as to create at least the same performances or progress of these countries.
I do not consider developed countries because of signicant dierences with developing countries.
Especially, the outputs indicators for developed countries vary little and are close to the maximum
while their priorities are dierent with those of less developed ones. Finally, in terms of policy
implications, it seems more relevant for a developing country to target closed performers rather
than pursuing unrealistic goals.
Using a ne decomposition of public spending would have been interesting to link each sector
13
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to the corresponding outputs indicators as it is often done for the education and health sectors.
Unfortunately, there is not such a comprehensive dataset on public spending for our sample. I
then use two major components of public spending as inputs: the share of public investment in
GDP and the share of general government nal consumption expenditure in GDP. Although the
analysis of discretionary choices of a government tends to oppose the growth-enhancing eects of
public investment to the retarding-eects of public consumption, there are some advantages to
use these expenditures. The trade-o between investment and consumption cannot be reduced
to a perfect substitution. As stated before, the composition of public expenditure matters for
the eciency of a type and the whole of expenditure. Specically, spending in infrastructures
may require some given amount of government consumption components to be eective and vice
versa. For example, building new hospitals and schools will be eective if there is a sucient
and appropriate number of nurses, doctors and teachers and working material. In many cases,
this may involve a recruitment of new employees, new salaries, wages' increase and new public
purchases. Using public investment and consumption allows to include both the consumption
and the infrastructures of the set of sectors. I then account for the phenomena of composition
and complementarity in explaining public eciency.
Public investment is proxied by the gross xed capital formation expenditure of the public sector.
I had three possibilities. Indeed, The World Bank Group has developed a dataset of public
gross xed capital formation expenditure for African Economies through African Development
Indicators (ADI) while the African Development Bank (AfDB hereafter) reports two datasets
using the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the former institution and the World Economic
Outlook (WEO) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The three datasets show a slight
dierence for most of the countries but with some huge dierences for few countries. In order to
allow a more consistent comparison among countries both African and non-African, I subtract the
gross xed capital formation expenditure of the private sector from the total one using WDI. The
resulted dataset is also close to the three former ones. Where data are missing, I complete with
the three latter by using the one which presents the same gures with the calculated existing ones
for each country. For minor cases, I do not have any possibility of using the above construction.
14
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So I use data from the articles IV of IMF3. Data on government consumption are from UN
Database.
Regarding outputs, in line with the common practice in the related literature, I consider human
capital indicators. They comprise two indicators of health: the ve-year infant mortality and the
undernourished prevalence indexes and two education indicators: the gross secondary enrollment
and the literacy indexes from the Foundation for International Development Study and Research
(FERDI) (Closset et al., 2014). The higher the value of each index, the higher the quality of
human capital. In addition, I account for the sectoral economy productivity since there is a
strong evidence that too high government size may harm economic performances. However, the
African governments through the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers have engaged to promote an
harmonious economic sectoral development including agriculture, industry and infrastructures.
The reforms undertaken might reduce the threat of "too" government size. Hence, I use the
US$ real per capita values added of agriculture, manufacture, construction, transport and the
wholesale and retail trade as additional outputs. I do not use the global industry value added
which includes mining sector since the resources from the latter are unstable and may suddenly
overestimate the country performances. My concern is clearly to look for the sustainable eciency
of the countries in close with their engagements. In order to avoid a "measurement bias" among
the outputs which may inuence the scores, I normalize these last outputs indicators by using a
Max-Min formula in such a way that the higher the value the higher the performance. Data on
these indicators derive from the United Nations database. This database provides data on former
Ethiopia and Ethiopia respectively including and excluding Eritrea since the independence of the
latter in 1993. It also separates Zanzibar from Tanzania. In both cases, I consider a single country
in order to stay coherent with the other datasets. Ethiopia includes the former and Ethiopia
excluding Eritrea since 1993. I add data for Zanzibar to those of Tanzania since the former is
still considered as a region of the latter.
Despite the fact that DEA is an interesting tool to assess countries performances, it imposes
some constraints to be ecient. Its discriminatory power is weak in the case of a large number
of inputs and/or outputs. For instance, drawing from Simar and Wilson (2000) and Groskop
3The dierent datasets are available upon request.
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(1996), Pang and Herrera (2005) note that too many outputs may biase eciency scores towards
one, increase the variance of the estimators and reduce their speed of convergence to the true
eciency estimators. This problem can be overcome by using the variables that provide essen-
tial component of production eliminating one of the pair of factors that shows a strong positive
correlation. Some authors estimate dierent scores alternating the number, the quality of inputs
and/or outputs. This generally yields contrasting results with a diculty in interpreting the
discrepancies in scores and ranks. I use here a simple and meaningful approach by summariz-
ing the nine outputs in two single indexes applying a Principal Component Analysis (PCA).
The human capital indicators constitute the rst index (HAI-Human Asset Index) while the
production indicators form the second index (PI-Production Index). Each index is obtained by
carrying all of the correspondent variables weighted by the associated coecients of the rst
PCA component. Details are in appendix. Furthermore, it is worth noting that this approach is
more relevant than estimating scores separately since the same inputs are used for producing the
outputs at the same period. Otherwise, one should face an overestimation or underestimation of
the scores. Finally, I augment the input ratios by 1 because of the null values of the investment
ratio for some countries. This ane transformation on inputs does not aect the results since
the individual performances are gauged relatively to the peers.
Table 1 reports the average levels of the public expenditure composition and the constructed
indexes across the sample countries over the covered period. Countries tend to spend much in
consumption than in investment, with three exceptions including Bangladesh, Egypt and Equato-
rial Guinea. Consumption is on average twice greater than investment. Africa reports the highest
ratios both of consumption and investment. Public investment in this continent is on average
8.9% of GDP against 17.2% of GDP for consumption expenditure. The sub-Saharan region, with
shares of 7.8 and 16.5% in GDP respectively of investment and consumption, spends less than the
Maghreb with respectively 9.9% and 17.9%. Meanwhile the share of investment in GDP in non-
African countries is on average 5.7% against 12.6% for consumption. Moreover, the disparities
in expenditure ratios among countries are huge ranking from 2.4% to 17.3% for investment and
from 4.8% to 31% for consumption. In terms of investment, the head of the most spending coun-
tries quantile are constituted of Equatorial Guinea (17.3%), Lesotho (15%), Burundi (13.9%),
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Libya (13%) and Egypt (12.9%) while Brazil (2.4%), Zimbabwe(2.8%), Guatemala (2.9%), Bul-
garia(3.8%), Uruguay (4%) are the ve least invest-involved countries. At the consumption side,
the most spending countries are Angola (31%), Lesotho (30.8%), Seychelles (29.2%), Namibia
(26.5%) and Libya (23.9%) while the relative least spending countries are Bangladesh (4.9%),
Guatemala (7.9%), Nepal(9%), Sierra Leone (9.6%) and Guinea (9.7%)
Regarding the output indexes, the picture is quite dierent. The non-African countries show
highest levels for both outputs indexes. They report 139.4 for HAI and 36.7 for Production
Index while Africa reports respectively 105.6 and 28.3. The bad performances in Africa are
mainly drawn by those of sub-Saharan region with 79.5 for HAI and 21.8 for PI. The ve highest
ranked countries in terms of HAI are Bulgaria (185.7), Uruguay (183.9), Seychelles (183.8), Fiji
(174.8) and Libya (172.52) whereas Chad (23.1), Burkina Faso (33.9), Burundi (33.9) Ethiopia
(34.3), Mozambique (37.3) show the lowest levels. For the PI, Seychelles and South Africa are
the only African countries among the best ve rated countries.
In short, the table shows that African countries tend to have relative higher government size
than the other economies but have lowest economic performances. But, this conclusion is not
always true in the light of the case of Seychelles. The next section provides estimates of the DEA
eciency scores.
4 Results
4.1 Eciency scores and the lost scal space
Table 2 reports the eciency scores of the VRS analysis for the whole of the seven periods for
each country and group of countries. It also reports the average of eciency scores (Average)
over the period and the number of times (Times) the country has been on the frontier as well as
the average of the resources level that would be saved if the country were ecient.
The results indicate that African countries on average are not ecient in comparison with the
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Table 1: Output Indexes and Public expenditure (% of GDP) in sample countries
Country HAI Index Product Index Public Investment Public Consumption Total expenditure
Bangladesh 84.902 6.885 5.972 4.873 10.845
Brazil 163.429 64.397 2.375 17.264 19.640
Bulgaria 185.724 61.938 3.831 16.864 20.694
Fiji 174.795 61.804 6.571 16.883 23.453
Guatemala 110.067 42.005 2.868 7.913 10.781
Honduras 133.893 26.914 6.441 13.684 20.124
India 100.882 12.393 8.735 11.440 20.175
Iran, Islamic Rep. 147.649 34.677 9.282 14.175 23.457
Jordan 170.030 27.646 8.084 23.665 31.749
Nepal 83.812 6.303 5.921 9.037 14.958
Pakistan 78.423 14.323 6.738 11.190 17.928
Peru 149.954 42.091 4.780 9.719 14.498
Philippines 156.692 24.582 4.127 9.891 14.018
Sri Lanka 159.790 23.211 4.479 11.402 15.881
Thailand 146.011 49.048 7.439 11.598 19.036
Uruguay 183.860 88.901 3.963 12.616 16.579
Non-African 139.370 36.695 5.725 12.638 18.364
Algeria 141.189 35.555 11.567 16.307 27.874
Egypt, Arab Rep. 137.002 21.703 12.943 12.760 25.704
Libya 172.528 48.720 12.985 23.924 36.909
Mauritania 78.979 19.650 8.979 20.670 29.650
Morocco 114.689 35.536 5.217 17.457 22.675
Tunisia 145.795 48.238 7.873 16.402 24.274
Arab Maghreb Union 131.697 34.900 9.927 17.920 27.847
Angola 48.871 21.433 7.154 31.004 38.158
Benin 61.615 11.988 7.834 13.000 20.834
Botswana 127.232 38.693 10.786 23.401 34.187
Burkina Faso 33.855 7.766 9.787 19.782 29.570
Burundi 33.874 3.752 13.893 17.441 31.333
Cabo Verde 134.761 40.448 7.935 20.054 27.989
Cameroon 76.922 19.692 4.370 11.191 15.561
Central African Republic 37.822 10.283 5.461 12.926 18.387
Chad 23.149 7.507 6.852 16.125 22.977
Comoros 70.670 23.841 9.825 20.459 30.284
Congo, Rep. 93.187 19.912 11.768 16.724 28.492
Cote d'Ivoire 70.392 21.706 4.941 11.737 16.678
Equatorial Guinea 89.847 24.359 17.253 16.726 33.979
Ethiopia 34.333 2.385 8.256 11.058 19.314
Gabon 128.048 58.798 6.763 14.317 21.079
Gambia, The 69.028 9.993 8.739 15.756 24.495
Ghana 98.895 21.502 8.092 11.119 19.211
Guinea 48.735 3.368 5.825 9.695 15.520
Kenya 100.716 11.781 7.084 17.128 24.213
Lesotho 104.064 7.519 14.992 30.755 45.748
Malawi 67.075 5.726 9.054 16.686 25.740
Mali 40.849 10.216 8.881 12.181 21.062
Mauritius 164.129 70.425 7.462 13.497 20.960
Mozambique 37.302 4.451 11.314 11.659 22.973
Namibia 119.857 47.784 7.859 26.521 34.380
Niger 37.387 6.147 5.392 13.865 19.257
Nigeria 71.097 24.068 6.731 15.935 22.666
Rwanda 57.792 5.952 8.147 11.630 19.778
Senegal 66.787 12.369 4.886 15.885 20.771
Seychelles 183.809 116.389 10.039 29.181 39.219
Sierra Leone 39.994 11.227 4.799 9.642 14.441
South Africa 158.900 64.344 4.861 19.105 23.967
Swaziland 111.704 37.396 6.424 17.639 24.063
Tanzania 67.427 8.887 6.714 14.385 21.098
Togo 76.281 9.801 6.173 12.810 18.983
Uganda 66.575 7.487 4.756 11.330 16.086
Zambia 62.466 13.471 6.049 18.381 24.430
Zimbabwe 107.362 4.423 2.835 18.011 20.846
Sub-Saharan Africa 79.548 21.771 7.894 16.546 24.440
Overall Africa 105.622 28.336 8.911 17.233 26.144
Overall sample 116.871 31.122 7.849 15.701 23.550
Max 185.724 116.389 17.253 31.004 45.748
Min 23.149 2.385 2.375 4.873 10.781
Source: Author's construction, FERDI, World Bank, IMF and UNDATABASE.
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Table 2: Summary of DEA scores and average lost scal space (waste)
Country 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09 2010-13 Average Times Lost Fiscal space
Bangladesh 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 7.000 0.000
Brazil 1.000 1.000 0.752 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.965 6.000 0.756
Bulgaria 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.866 0.751 0.944 0.937 4.000 1.390
Fiji 0.651 0.703 0.661 0.689 0.681 0.979 0.982 0.764 0.000 5.947
Guatemala 0.940 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.991 6.000 0.114
Honduras 0.585 0.585 0.673 0.778 0.668 0.649 0.769 0.672 0.000 6.670
India 0.582 0.506 0.522 0.502 0.642 0.618 0.651 0.575 0.000 8.643
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.405 0.514 0.667 0.691 0.754 0.746 0.951 0.675 0.000 8.333
Jordan 0.394 0.435 0.483 0.456 0.585 0.605 0.745 0.529 0.000 15.562
Mexico 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 7.000 0.000
Nepal 0.650 0.634 0.680 0.615 0.886 0.788 0.834 0.727 0.000 4.220
Pakistan 0.530 0.479 0.464 0.513 0.851 0.774 0.895 0.644 0.000 7.041
Peru 0.766 0.816 1.000 0.895 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.925 4.000 1.227
Philippines 0.974 1.000 0.943 0.809 0.956 1.000 1.000 0.955 2.000 0.711
Sri Lanka 1.000 0.870 0.994 0.955 0.993 0.686 0.738 0.891 1.000 2.089
Thailand 0.619 0.679 0.798 0.846 0.860 0.805 0.814 0.774 0.000 4.327
Uruguay 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 7.000 0.000
Non-African 0.770 0.778 0.802 0.809 0.867 0.847 0.901 0.825 72.131 3.943
Algeria 0.473 0.428 0.522 0.515 0.626 0.697 0.507 0.538 0.000 13.005
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.398 0.497 0.747 0.783 0.782 0.731 0.813 0.679 0.000 9.259
Libya 0.405 0.327 0.452 0.496 0.668 1.000 0.417 0.538 1.000 18.231
Mauritania 0.196 0.418 0.658 0.834 0.415 0.495 0.583 0.514 0.000 16.781
Morocco 0.432 0.599 0.594 0.685 0.571 0.612 0.578 0.582 0.000 9.595
Tunisia 0.484 0.458 0.516 0.571 0.725 0.893 1.000 0.664 0.000 9.078
Maghreb 0.398 0.454 0.581 0.647 0.631 0.738 0.650 0.586 1.639 12.658
Angola 0.373 0.597 0.429 0.325 0.398 0.422 0.458 0.429 0.000 22.077
Benin 0.488 0.499 0.606 0.558 0.594 0.563 0.580 0.555 0.000 9.302
Botswana 0.359 0.345 0.309 0.272 0.394 0.452 0.530 0.380 0.000 21.498
Burkina Faso 0.497 0.383 0.301 0.340 0.400 0.350 0.471 0.392 0.000 18.228
Burundi 0.579 0.501 0.392 0.313 0.454 0.294 0.292 0.404 0.000 19.425
Cabo Verde 0.410 0.722 0.548 0.548 0.506 0.517 0.520 0.539 0.000 13.016
Cameroon 0.749 0.567 0.759 1.000 0.963 0.703 0.649 0.770 1.000 3.968
Central African R. 0.507 0.489 0.431 0.548 0.687 0.785 0.919 0.624 0.000 7.546
Chad 0.798 0.609 0.501 0.404 0.279 0.810 0.643 0.578 0.000 11.367
Comoros 0.232 0.279 0.386 0.486 0.588 0.567 0.563 0.443 0.000 18.380
Congo, Rep. 0.499 0.375 0.845 0.500 0.514 0.514 0.595 0.549 0.000 13.104
Cote d'Ivoire 0.423 0.663 0.679 0.674 1.000 0.923 0.870 0.747 1.000 5.127
Equatorial Guinea 0.209 0.271 0.313 0.704 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.642 3.000 16.057
Ethiopia 1.000 0.894 0.751 0.546 0.442 0.501 0.679 0.688 1.000 7.084
Gabon 0.594 0.576 0.648 0.634 0.891 0.824 0.528 0.671 0.000 7.517
Gambia, The 0.199 0.448 0.502 0.518 0.669 0.731 0.621 0.527 0.000 13.451
Ghana 1.000 0.637 0.496 0.480 0.596 0.574 0.626 0.630 1.000 7.819
Guinea 0.589 0.608 0.580 0.766 0.920 0.869 0.702 0.719 0.000 4.733
Kenya 0.434 0.449 0.407 0.454 0.478 0.526 0.558 0.472 0.000 12.831
Lesotho 0.432 0.282 0.227 0.209 0.277 0.298 0.286 0.287 0.000 33.062
Malawi 0.379 0.439 0.378 0.402 0.522 0.454 0.478 0.436 0.000 14.573
Mali 0.527 0.469 0.457 0.466 0.716 0.536 0.613 0.541 0.000 9.865
Mauritius 0.711 0.761 0.738 0.739 0.765 0.791 0.853 0.765 0.000 4.956
Mozambique 0.416 0.524 0.461 0.653 0.589 0.515 0.465 0.518 0.000 11.279
Namibia 0.326 0.439 0.346 0.379 0.543 0.591 0.439 0.438 0.000 19.841
Niger 0.685 1.000 0.513 0.532 0.567 0.486 0.602 0.626 1.000 7.568
Nigeria 0.465 1.000 0.622 0.480 0.386 0.499 0.501 0.565 1.000 10.569
Rwanda 0.509 0.551 0.515 0.523 0.576 0.604 0.654 0.562 0.000 8.654
Senegal 0.430 0.733 0.632 0.604 0.622 0.553 0.577 0.593 0.000 8.544
Seychelles 0.431 0.511 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.849 5.000 6.562
Sierra Leone 0.779 0.983 0.671 0.849 0.636 0.757 0.643 0.760 0.000 3.747
South Africa 0.685 0.719 0.756 0.907 0.725 0.589 0.556 0.705 0.000 7.289
Swaziland 0.359 0.516 0.514 0.609 0.545 0.610 0.622 0.539 0.000 11.406
Tanzania 0.564 0.559 0.375 0.776 0.635 0.445 0.512 0.552 0.000 9.928
Togo 0.352 0.442 0.651 0.783 1.000 0.729 0.690 0.664 1.000 7.588
Uganda 0.794 0.778 0.616 0.642 0.550 0.616 0.797 0.685 0.000 5.290
Zambia 0.397 0.609 0.479 0.430 0.523 0.491 0.594 0.503 0.000 12.240
Zimbabwe 0.602 1.000 0.666 0.926 0.816 1.000 0.522 0.790 2.000 4.911
SSA 0.521 0.585 0.539 0.578 0.625 0.618 0.611 0.583 11.326
Overall Africa 0.504 0.567 0.545 0.588 0.626 0.634 0.616 0.583 0.356 11.508
Overall sample 0.575 0.624 0.619 0.652 0.695 0.694 0.697 0.651 0.968 9.397
Source: Author's estimations using FERDI, World Bank, IMF and UN databases.
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non-African countries. The average eciency score of public spending for African countries over
the span of the study is 0.585 against 0.825 for the non-African. This implies that on aver-
age African countries should reduce their spending by 41.5% to achieve the same performances
whereas non-African countries should reduce theirs by 17.5%. The results also show that there
is no discrepancy in eciency among Maghreb and sub-Saharan African regions. Indeed, both
record the same eciency score. The analysis of gure 1 shows that there is no signicant shift
in the trend of the eciency scores. Eciency has steadily increased from 0.575 to 0.697 for
the whole sample. This upward tendency is mainly due to that of the non-African countries yet
retarded by the slight progress of African performances. Taking African economies specically,
the results evidence that the sub-Saharan region is the main driver of the African tendency. The
North region presents an evolution by jerks and jumps. The breaking in the increase tendency
in Sub-Saharan Africa over the two last periods may be explained by the recent food prices crisis
that has caused a signicant increase in public spending to mitigate its consequences but with
low amelioration in the outputs indicators. Thus, the results do not show a signicant change
in the quality of public spending in Africa and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa suggesting
that the claim of expansion of public spending to boost progress in the frame of the Millennium
Development Goals' launch does not necessary create a sustained scal space.
The individual analysis of the countries shows that only a few African countries have been
situated on the frontier at least once. Seychelles is the best ranked African country in terms
of the number of times to reach the eciency frontier. It has reached the frontier ve times
consecutively since the 1990's. It is followed by Equatorial Guinea, three 3 times, since 2000's
and Zimbabwe over 1985-1989 and 2005-2009. Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Libya,
Niger, Nigeria and Togo achieve this performance only once. On the contrary, the group of non-
African countries provides the most ecient countries. Bangladesh, Mexico and Uruguay have
always been on the frontier while Brazil and Guatemala present ineciency only once. Peru is
ecient since 2000's, Philippines since the period of 2005-2009 while Sri Lanka met eciency
over 1980-1984's period.
Nevertheless, the ranking according to the number of times may hide some heterogeneities in
eciency progress of certain countries. The ranking according to the average level of eciency's
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Figure 1: Evolution of Eciency scores in group of countries
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score does not always follow the same path as the former particularly in the case of Africa. With
an average score of 0.849, Seychelles remains the most African ecient economy. It is followed by
Zimbabwe (0.79), Cameroon (0.77), Mauritius (0.765), Sierra Leone (0.76). The recent progress
of Equatorial Guinea is balanced by the ineciency of the four rst periods leading to a rank
of 15th with an average score of 0.642 while Nigeria is now ranked 22th with a score of 0.565.
The dierence in the two rankings suggests that over time some countries become more ecient
and others did not. The less ve ecient countries are Angola (0.429), Burundi (0.404), Burkina
Faso (0.392) Botswana (0.38) and Lesotho (0.287). South Africa as the most advanced African
economy is ranked 8th. Figure 2 depicts the correlation between the eciency scores and the ratio
of public spending across the main group countries. The correlation is negative suggesting that
larger public spending does not provide returns irrespective the region considered and the type
of public spending. This nding is in line with a number of studies investigating the eciency
of public spending (Gupta and Verhoeven, 2001; Pang and Herrera, 2005; Afonso et al., 2005;
Chemli and Neticha, 2006; Verhoeven et al., 2007; Afonso et al., 2010; Vierstraete, 2012).
As suggested before, loss in eciency creates loss in public resources. The lost of scal space
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Figure 2: Eciency scores and the level of public spending
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computed through table 2 has been generated by multiplying the level of resources used by
the dierence between the maximum eciency score (1) and the estimated eciency score ().
Let's remind that (1   ) corresponds to the proportion of the used resources a country should
reduce in order to realize the same amount of outputs, i.e. to be ecient. Then, a country's
loss of scal space is estimated relatively to the eciency of the peers of a country. The lost
scal space when a country is ecient is zero. Thus, the loss in scal space created by the
ineciency of public spending in Africa is about 11.5% of GDP equivalent to 43.8% of the
outlay used. It is 11.3% of GDP, about 46.3% of the allocated resources for SSA and 45.4% for
the Maghreb. Rationally, non-African countries exhibit less lost scal resources. The leakage
for the non-Africans is around four times less than that of the African region. An insight in
individual countries shows that how much the country is hit by the ineciency depends on the
level of outlays conrming the premise that larger public sector is more harmful when eciency
is missed. For instance, Seychelles loses much room (6.56%) than Cameroon (3.97%), Mauritius
(4.96%), Zimbabwe (4.91%) and Uganda (5.29%) although it has the best practice in Africa
because it spends much. The eciency of Seychelles is then explained by the fact it outperforms
in terms of outputs. With a high government size but low level outputs, the ineciency of
Lesotho translates into the highest loss estimated up to 33.06%.
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Until now, the ndings are analyzed in a static way considering whether a country becomes
closer to or farther away from the eciency frontier (Aubyn et al., 2009). Let's now examine
the eciency in a dynamic way assuming that the frontier itself is not static since I am dealing
with panel data. My concern is to determine how productivity has grown and what drives this
improvement: amelioration in the quality of public management (change in technical eciency) or
a movement of the production frontier (technological change). For that, I use Malmquist index to
decompose the total factor productivity (Tfpch) into its eciency (EFFCH) and technological
(techch) components over time. This exercise is important since almost all African countries
record a steady growth of some indicators especially those of human capital while those of non-
African economies tend to stagnate at high levels. This may suggest that African countries have
grown fast and substantially relatively to non-African ones although they are inecient. Table
3 sums up these indexes, more details are provided in table 8 of appendix.
The analysis of the two tables shows that on average for the full sample, total factor productivity
improves substantially. The change is equal to 1.165 suggesting a rise in TFP by 16.5%. This
increase results mainly from that in eciency which rises by 12.2% whereas technology change
improves slowly by 4%. African regions record the biggest amelioration due to a signicant
increase in eciency by 14.1% and a slight increase in technology by 4.1%. This result suggests
that the improvement in the quality of public resources management is the main driver of TFP
by up to more 75%. In addition to this analysis, I spur my curiosity to see how this improvement
in eciency is correlated with the waste of resources. Trivially, the negative correlation in gure
3 supports the idea that better quality of scal management throughout time helps country to
create more resources.
A striking outperformance of 4.42 is noted by Chad over 2005-2009 after a decrease in the
previous period due to a signicant fall in public spending ratio over 2005-2009. However, as
demonstrated by gure 3, the exclusion of this value from the data does not aect the negative
correlation between eciency change and unsaved scal space. On average, the African countries
that have decreased in eciency improvement are Angola, Gabon, Ghana, Lesotho, South Africa
and Zimbabwe. However Angola, Ghana and partially Lesotho have recorded signicant progress
to become productive while the more recent decline in Gabon and South Africa points some
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Table 3: Malmquist index summary of countries means
Country Ech Techch Pech Sech Tfpch Country Ech Techch Pech Sech Tfpch
Bangladesh 1.132 1.047 1.000 1.132 1.186 Comoros 1.216 1.037 1.160 1.049 1.261
Brazil 0.973 1.060 1.000 0.973 1.031 Congo, Rep. 1.031 1.071 1.030 1.001 1.105
Bulgaria 0.999 1.044 0.990 1.009 1.043 Cote d'Ivoire 1.148 1.055 1.128 1.018 1.211
Fiji 1.073 1.042 1.071 1.002 1.119 Equatorial Guinea 1.418 1.065 1.298 1.093 1.511
Guatemala 1.068 1.030 1.010 1.057 1.101 Ethiopia 1.124 1.026 0.937 1.199 1.153
Honduras 1.075 1.034 1.047 1.027 1.112 Gabon 0.992 1.039 0.981 1.012 1.031
India 1.072 1.025 1.019 1.052 1.099 Gambia, The 1.410 1.038 1.209 1.166 1.463
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1.180 1.034 1.153 1.024 1.220 Ghana 0.951 1.029 0.925 1.029 0.979
Jordan 1.117 1.031 1.112 1.005 1.152 Guinea 1.096 1.026 1.030 1.064 1.124
Mexico 1.000 1.031 1.000 1.000 1.031 Kenya 1.046 1.025 1.043 1.003 1.072
Nepal 1.178 1.022 1.042 1.130 1.203 Lesotho 0.936 1.014 0.934 1.003 0.949
Pakistan 1.127 1.020 1.091 1.033 1.150 Malawi 1.098 1.029 1.039 1.057 1.131
Peru 1.061 1.033 1.045 1.015 1.096 Mali 1.148 1.032 1.026 1.119 1.185
Philippines 1.006 1.025 1.004 1.002 1.031 Mauritius 1.034 1.030 1.031 1.003 1.065
Sri Lanka 0.947 1.010 0.951 0.996 0.957 Mozambique 1.219 1.046 1.019 1.196 1.274
Thailand 1.063 1.030 1.047 1.015 1.095 Namibia 1.054 1.051 1.051 1.003 1.108
Uruguay 1.022 1.041 1.000 1.022 1.063 Niger 1.112 1.045 0.979 1.136 1.162
Non-Africans 1.079 1.036 1.115
Nigeria 1.072 1.039 1.012 1.059 1.114
Algeria 1.040 1.028 1.011 1.028 1.069 Rwanda 1.205 1.037 1.043 1.156 1.249
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1.168 1.036 1.126 1.037 1.210 Senegal 1.104 1.046 1.050 1.052 1.155
Libya 1.002 1.025 1.005 0.997 1.027 Seychelles 1.082 1.073 1.150 0.941 1.161
Mauritania 1.219 1.053 1.199 1.016 1.284 Sierra Leone 1.040 1.050 0.968 1.074 1.092
Morocco 1.103 1.037 1.050 1.050 1.143 South Africa 0.972 1.028 0.966 1.006 0.999
Tunisia 1.158 1.035 1.128 1.027 1.199 Swaziland 1.085 1.033 1.096 0.990 1.121
Maghreb 1.148 1.037 1.191
Tanzania 1.045 1.022 0.984 1.062 1.068
Angola 0.964 1.034 1.035 0.932 0.997 Togo 1.206 1.031 1.118 1.078 1.243
Benin 1.131 1.044 1.029 1.099 1.181 Uganda 1.025 1.024 1.001 1.025 1.050
Botswana 1.092 1.031 1.067 1.024 1.126 Zambia 1.027 1.024 1.069 0.961 1.052
Burkina Faso 1.121 1.029 0.991 1.131 1.153 Zimbabwe 0.967 1.072 0.977 0.990 1.037
Burundi 1.050 1.038 0.892 1.177 1.090 SSA 1.140 1.042 1.185
Cabo Verde 1.078 1.075 1.040 1.036 1.158 Mean 1.085 1.037 1.038 1.045 1.125
Cameroon 1.017 1.031 0.976 1.042 1.048
Central African Rep. 1.170 1.030 1.104 1.059 1.205
Chad 1.122 1.033 0.965 1.163 1.158
Note: All Malmquist index averages are geometric means
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Figure 3: Loss growth and Eciency change
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Source: Author's estimations. Lossgrowth = ln(loss+ 1)  l:ln(loss+ 1). The value of Chad over 2005-2009 has
been dropped without changing the original trend. Loss growth=growth of lost scal space.
governance concerns. For example, Ghana records productivity since the mid of 1990's. Many
countries such as Mauritius, Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea have also improved over
time while some others have declined like Cote d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe. For example, the performance
of Zimbabwe has substantially declined from a gain of 96% over 2005-2009 to a loss of 56% over
2010-2013. The begun boom of Equatorial Guinea since the mid of 1990's has blurred in the two
last periods.
In general quality of public spending has been thus improved in Africa but with some dis-
parities among countries and over time. This stage of my results does not conrm those of
Gupta and Verhoeven (2001) who nd that increase in the productivity in Africa is driven by
outward shifts in the eciency frontier. This progress may be attributed to the Public Finance
Management Reforms undertaken under the donor pressures in the frame of Structural Adjust-
ment Programs and strengthened in the frame of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
initiatives. However, the fact that they are still inecient involves other critical challenges in
terms of ensuring a sustainable scal space for poverty reduction.
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4.2 Rebranding quality of public spending and scal building for better performances
This section depicts how the unsaved scal space is connected to other aspects of scal space.
The three rst are interesting in the relationship between waste and tax capacity building us-
ing Dataset on government revenues from International Center for taxation and Development
(ICTD) (Prichard et al., 2014). Building a sustainable taxation in developing countries like
Africa is doubly important. It would serve not only for curbing the shortage of poverty allevi-
ation funding but also to leave the fragility in which they are. Domestic taxation has clearly
been identied as a certain way to induce much broader improvements in state administrations
capacity (Brautigam et al., 2008; Prichard and Leonard, 2010). Moreover, reliance on domestic
taxes instead of foreign assistance is pro-governance by generating incentives to build strong so-
cial contract and accountability between state and its citizens (Moore, 1998; Knack, 2009). This
implies in some extent a high degree of tax compliance. The rst three gures intend for showing
that poor quality management of existing resources is one of the engines of the weak results of
taxation reforms in Africa. When citizens are sure that their eorts are poorly managed and
nd dicult to be provided good public services, their trust in government reduces and they
become less encouraged to pay taxes. The social bargaining therefore weakens and the level of
the collected taxes remains structurally low. Tax capacity is often measured by the level of the
potential stable domestic revenues, i.e. excluding resources revenues. When considering the rst
gure, a positive correlation between overall government revenues and waste in public outlays
surprisingly seems to exist. But, the decomposition into non resource tax revenues and resource
tax revenues provides a dierent picture. Tax capacity ratio is negatively associated with waste
in public spending. In contrast, there is a positive correlation between waste in public spending
and resource revenues suggesting the well-documented problem of "resource curse".
Low levels of domestic tax capacity and resource curse induced by poor quality of public resources
are conducive to foreign assistance dependence and concerns on scal sustainability. Figure 5
shows that the inability of governments to create room by improving eciency of spending is
negatively related to domestic saving. When domestic saving is low, prospects of economic growth
become pessimistic and incentives to invest decline compromising future rebuilding of saving. To
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Figure 4: Lost scal space and tax capacity development in Africa
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Source: Author's estimations, World Bank and ICTD.
nance its activities, governments may try to create scal space through new borrowing or
mobilization of foreign assistance (Committee et al., 2006). Figure 5 shows that the loss in scal
space is positively associated with foreign aid and net ows on external debt in Africa. The
eects of foreign aid on the recipient countries are still debatable. Although, many African
countries benet from a concessional debt, the risk of change remains prominent and may cause
sovereign insolvency. With a limited room due to government ineciency and low institutional
development, the scal adjustment would be more disastrous. Figure 6 reconciles the scal space
approach of IMF that emphasizes on eciency of public spending and scal sustainability and
that of Roy et al. (2009). As one would expect, the more a country loses because of ineciency,
the more public stance worsens, suggesting that quality of public nances is associated with
scal sustainability. In terms of outcomes, the gure shows that economic growth is negatively
correlated to the loss of scal space although the link seems to be weak.
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Figure 5: Lost scal space, domestic saving and external nancing in Africa
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Figure 6: Lost scal space, scal balance and economic growth in Africa
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5 Conclusion and policy implications
The main goal of this paper is to estimate the scal space African countries could have mobilized
by improving the quality of public spending and to examine whether the current progress does
not hide some waste. The quality of public spending is gauged by the eciency scores of Data
Envelopment Analysis using a large sample of 62 countries including 17 developing and emerging
countries outside Africa over the period 1980-2013. It considers two groups of outputs comprising
human capital and sectoral economic development indicators and two major public expenditures
components, government consumption and investment. The results indicate that the 45 African
countries on average are less ecient than the non-African countries. The average eciency
score for African countries is 0.585 against 0.825 for the non-African countries. This suggests
that on average African countries should reduce their spending by 41.5% to achieve their obtained
results whereas non-African should reduce theirs by 17.5%. The lost scal space created by the
ineciency in Africa is about 11.5% of GDP equivalent to 43.8% of the outlay used. The unsaved
scal space represents more than 3/4 of the current level of tax revenues in Africa.
However, the Malmquist index decomposition of the ineciency shows that African countries
have achieved a substantial improvement in the quality of spending in comparison with the
other countries involving a reduction in the waste of revenues. But this improvement remains
insucient to become more ecient than the non-African countries. This suggests improving
government management and governance remains an absolute factor of signicant progress in
Africa. These results urge that strengthening the good governance reforms are highly of impor-
tance in order to deepen the current progress in a sustainable way as highlighting the connection
between the lost scal space and the other scal space policies. Indeed, the results show that
larger waste of scal space is positively correlated with foreign aid, external debt ows, scal
decit but negatively with tax capacity. Moreover, there is a positive correlation between re-
source tax and the lost scal space while the negative correlation between African eciency level
and per capita economic growth seems to be weak.
In spite of these logical results, some cautions should be pointed in interpreting the ndings.
Although I have paid a great attention to the data treatment, the issue of data quality of
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public spending notably of investment remains. This problem is not new but closely related
to the low institutional development in developing countries. For instance, Fosu et al. (2012)
have pointed this kind of problem in their study. The databases of the World Bank and the
African Development Bank that I use in this study are currently the most developed ones to
my knowledge. Another point due to data availability is the limitation of the sample size which
may aect the respective ranks if additional countries are introduced. Moreover, the impact of
government spending on some output indicators may drag on several periods so that the observed
ineciencies may be the result of the previous decision-makings (Gupta and Verhoeven, 2001).
Finally, one may apply alternative methods of eciency evaluation such as stochastic methods
to provide additional robustness to the present ndings.
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A Composite Index construction of the outputs
Table 4: Principal components/correlation: composite index of human capital indicators
Component Eigenvalue Dierence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 2.98287 2.3115 0.7457 0.7457
Comp2 0.671366 0.454812 0.1678 0.9136
Comp3 0.216554 0.0873408 0.0541 0.9677
Comp4 0.129213 . 0.0323 1.0000
Source: FERDI. Number of observations: 427
Table 5: Principal components (eigenvectors): HAI index
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Unexplained
Under Five Mortality Index (U5M) 0.5468 -0.0936 -0.3815 -0.7394 0
Undernourished prevalence Index (U) 0.4100 0.8367 0.3630 0.0100 0
Secondary Enrollment Gross Index(SE) 0.5448 -0.0572 -0.5021 0.6692 0
Literacy Index(LR) 0.4858 -0.5366 0.6860 0.0733 0
Source: FERDI. Number of observations: 427
Index hai acp=U5M*0.5468 +U* 0.41 +SE* 0.5448 +LR*0.4858
Table 6: Principal components/correlation: sectoral production value added index
Component Eigenvalue Dierence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 3.39109 2.68888 0.6782 0.6782
Comp2 0.702213 0.290466 0.1404 0.8187
Comp3 0.411746 0.122879 0.0823 0.9010
Comp4 0.288868 0.0827877 0.0578 0.9588
Comp5 0.20608 . 0.0412 1.0000
Sources: UN DATABASE and World Bank. Number of observations: 427
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Table 7: Principal components(eigenvectors: sectoral productive values added)
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Unexplained
Agriculture(agri) 0.3455 0.9026 0.2156 -0.0207 0.1381 0
Construction(constr) 0.4773 -0.1958 -0.3681 -0.5073 0.5839 0
Manufacture(manu) 0.4691 -0.0403 -0.4770 0.7401 -0.0547 0
Transports(trans) 0.4945 -0.0756 -0.0167 -0.3856 -0.7751 0
Whole and retail trade (trade) 0.4338 -0.3737 0.7682 0.2139 0.1902 0
Sources: UN DATABASE and World Bank. Number of observations: 427
Index product=Agri*0.3355+Constr*0.4773+Manu*0.4691+Trans*0.4945+Trade* 0.4338
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